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NOTE
THE NEGOTIABILITY OF PARITY
AGREEMENTS IN PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
I. Introduction
Parity clauses' historically have been included in collective negotia-
tion agreements between municipal employers and public employee
unions, particularly those involving police and firefighter's unions.
2
By maintaining recognizable relationships between the levels of com-
pensation afforded various occupations, parity clauses were used as an
aid to negotiators, arbitrators and political officials in calculating the
salaries of municipal employees.3 In the past few decades parity
clauses have become an increasingly common feature of public sector
collective bargaining agreements, 4 and a frequent source of tension
between public employers and employees.
Wage parity in the public sector is an important concern of public
employees who pressure their union representatives for wage protec-
tion.5 Parity is also of importance to city administrators, contract
negotiators and the taxpaying public,6 all of whom are affected by
federal budget reductions, inflationary pressures on state and local
budgets7 and public demand for cost-efficient services. 8
1. Parity is defined as the fixed relationship between two or more professional
groups in terms of wages, fringe benefits and job status, which must be maintained
for the life of a contract. Parity in the Public Sector, MIDWEST MONITOR, July-Aug.
1980, at 1. The concept includes wage equality as well as dollar or percentage
differentials which are to remain constant. Lieutenants' Benevolent Ass'n and the
City of New York, New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, No. B-10-75, at 11
(1975); Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n and the City of New York, New York City
Office of Collective Bargaining, No. B-14-72, at 2 (1972); City of New York, 10 N.Y.
PUB. EMp. REL. BD. J 10-3003, at 3010 (1977).
2. S. SPERO & J. CAPOZZOLA, THE URBAN COMMUNITY AND ITS UNIONIZED Bu-
REAUCRACIES 218 (1973). For example, New York City has had a parity clause in its
personnel procedures since 1898. Parity in the Public Sector, MIDWEST MONITOR,
July-Aug. 1980, at 2.
3. S. SPERO & J. CAPOZZOLA, supra note 2, at 218.
4. Lafranchise & Leibig, Collective Bargaining for Parity in the Public Sector, 32
LAB. L.J. 598, 599 (1981).
5. Id. at 598.
6. Parity in the Public Sector, MIDwEST MONITOR, July-Aug. 1980, at 1.
7. Lafranchise & Leibig, supra note 4, at 598. The advent of public sector collec-
tive bargaining in New York State in 1967 seems to have provided public employees
with more protection against inflation than previously afforded. In May 1977, the
National Cities average cost of living was 181.3 (a figure calculated by converting
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
In the early 1970's, state courts and public employment relations
boards declared generally that parity clauses are valid, enforceable,
and a permissible subject of bargaining.9 During 1976 and 1977,
however, the legality of parity arrangements in public employment
contracts was challenged in many states.10 Parity was held to be
unlawful and a prohibited subject of bargaining by state public em-
ployment relations boards in New York," Massachusetts, 12 New Jer-
sey,' 3 and Pennsylvania. 14 The highest appellate courts of Connecti-
cut 15 and Maine, 16 and the New York' 7 Supreme Court handed down
similar decisions.
A recent challenge to a parity clause in City of Schenectady and
City Fire Fighters Union, Local 2818 resulted in the first decision that
wage and salary changes to an index comparable to the consumer price index). By
contrast, the figure relating to maximum patrolmen's salaries was 206.6. The preva-
lence of parity suggests substantially the same result for firemen, and the figure for
teachers' salaries was 208.0, placing these employees somewhat ahead of inflationary
trends. Joyner, Economic and Fiscal Trends, PERB [Public Employment Relations
Board] News, Sept. 1977, at 3, cited in W. NEWHOUSE, PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 88-90 (1978).
8. Lafranchise & Leibig, supra note 4, at 598.
9. Many public sector decisions followed the approach developed in the private
sector. Wheeler, Berger & McGarry, Parity: An Evaluation of Recent Court and
Board Decisions, 29 LAB. L.J. 178, 178 (1978) (citing Cooperative St. Ry. Shop
Employees Ass'n v. New Orleans Pub. Servs., 352 F. Supp. 1100 (D.C. La. 1972);
City of Detroit v. Killingsworth, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2752 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne
County 1972); City of Detroit, MICH. EMP. REL. COMM'N, No. C72-A-1 (1972);
General Teamster, Warehouse and Dairy Employees, Local 126, 176 N.L.R.B. 406
(1969)).
10. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976);
Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1976); Doyle v. City of
Troy, 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dep't 1976); Local 1219, Int'l Ass'n of
Fire Fighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations Bd., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098 (1976);
Medford School Comm., MASS. LAB. REL. COMM'N, No. MUP-2349 (1977); City of
Plainfield, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4 NJPER 225 4130 (1978);
City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003 (1977); Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Bd. v. Commonwealth of Pa., Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., No. PERA-C-7323-C, 9
PPERB 9-9084 (1978).
11. City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMp. REL. BD.- 10-3003 (1977); see notes 67-
79 infra and accompanying text.
12. Medford School Comm., MAss. LAB. REL. COMM'N, No. MUP-2349 (1977).
13. City of Plainfield, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4 NJPER 225
4130 (1978).
14. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Commonwealth of Pa., Pa. Lab. Rel.
Bd., No. PERA-C-7323-C, 9 PPERB 9-9084 (1978).
15. Local 1219, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations Bd., 93
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098 (1976).
16. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976).
17. Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1976); Doyle v.
City of Troy, 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dep't 1976). See notes 85-101
infra and accompanying text.
18. City of Schenectady, 85 A.D.2d 116, 448 N.Y.S.2d 806 (3d Dep't 1982).
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parity clauses are not invalid per se.19 The court cited the need for
case-by-case scrutiny of the parity provisions of a collective negotia-
tion agreement based upon the factual context of each case.
20
This Note will discuss the effect of City of Schenectady on the
negotiability of parity clauses in public sector employment contracts.
The New York State "Taylor Law" governing public employees, and
the New York courts' analysis of parity clauses under the Taylor Law
also will be discussed.21 Finally, City of Schenectady will be analyzed
for its effect on future parity clause enforcement in the courts. 22
II. Judicial Treatment of Parity Clauses
in Public Employment Contracts
Analysis of parity clauses in collective bargaining agreements tradi-
tionally has focused on the clause's effect on the bargaining of "third-
party" or "reference" unions.2 3 Using this analysis, some courts and
public employment commissions have upheld parity2 4 as a permissible
subject of bargaining.2 5 Parity agreements have been enforced in
Michigan 26 and Wisconsin,2 7 even though they amounted to an impo-
sition on the rights of the third-party union. 28 In these cases, the cities
of Detroit, Michigan and West Allis, Wisconsin were aware that a
19. Id. at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
20. Id.
21. See notes 45-60 infra and accompanying text.
22. See notes 138-56 infra and accompanying text.
23. These terms are used interchangeably to designate the union to which the
wage of the contracting unit is linked. For example, in a contract between a munici-
pality and a firefighters' union establishing parity between the firefighters' wage
increases and those of policemen which are to be negotiated at a later date, courts
have focused on the clause's effect on the policemen's subsequent negotiations. City
of Detroit, MICH. EMP. REL. COMM'N, No. C72-A-1 (1972); West Allis Professional
Policemen's Protective Ass'n, Wisc. EMP. REL. COMM'N, Case XX, No. 17300 MP-
294, Decision No. 12706 (1974).
24. See cases cited at note 23 supra.
25. A permissible subject is one about which the parties may bargain, but it may
not be insisted upon to the point of impasse. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
UNIONIZATION, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 529-30 (1976).
26. City of Detroit, MICH. EMP. REL. COMM'N, No. C72-A-1 (1972).
27. West Allis Professional Policemen's Protective Ass'n, Wisc. EMP. REL.
COMM'N, Case XX, No. 17300 MP-294, Decision No. 12706 (1974).
28. The Detroit Police Officers' Association charged the city with bad faith bar-
gaining and with denying the association its rights to free and competitive bargain-
ing. City of Detroit, MICH. EMP. REL. COMM'N, No. C72-A-1, at 1055-56. The West
Allis Professional Policemen's Protective Association averred that the inclusion of the
clause restrained and interfered with the rights of the policemen to bargain collec-
tively with the city. West Allis Professional Policemen's Protective Ass'n, Wisc. EMP.
REL. COMM'N, Case XX, No. 17300 MP-294, Decision No. 12706, at 4.
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raise given to the third-party union would result in an automatic raise
for the union which had the parity agreement. These employers,
therefore, were reluctant to negotiate a raise with the "reference
union."29 The Michigan and Wisconsin Public Employment Relations
Commissions held that the third-party union's right to "free and
untrammeled collective bargaining" was not denied by the employers'
consideration of the "facts of economic life." 30 These "facts" were
found to include higher aggregate labor costs due to the raise granted
to the union which negotiated the parity clause. 3' Therefore, an em-
ployer who deals with a number of unions must weigh the following
tactical consideration: a contract with one union will affect future
negotiations with other unions, which may point to pay increases
granted to one group as a justification for their own similar pro-
posals. 32
Until 1977, New York State also upheld parity clauses, 33 but under
a different rationale than that utilized in Michigan and Wisconsin. 34
The New York approach emphasized contractual principles, specifi-
cally the duty of performance. Under this view, mere financial dis-
tress, without a showing of greater hardship, does not excuse perform-
ance of a voluntarily assumed duty. 35 Thus, in New York, it was stated
that a possible endless spiraling of raises that might lead to the em-
29. See note 23 supra and accompanying text for definition of reference union.
City of Detroit, MICH. EMP. REL. COMM'N, No. C72-A-1, at 1055-56; West Allis
Professional Policemen's Protective Ass'n, Wisc. EMP. REL. COMM'N, Case XX, No.
17300 MP-294, Decision No. 12706, at 5.
30. City of Detroit, MICH. EMP. REL. COMM'N, No. C72-A-1, at 1056; West Allis
Professional Policemen's Protective Ass'n, Wisc. EMP. REL. COMM'N, Case XX, No.
17300 MP-294, Decision No. 12706, at 5; Lafranchise & Leibig, supra note 4, at 601.
31. City of Detroit, MICH. EMP. REL. COMM'N, No. C72-A-1, at 1056; West Allis
Professional Policemen's Protective Ass'n, Wisc. EMP. REL. COMM'N, Case XX, No.
17300 MP-294, Decision No. 12706, at 5; Lafranchise & Leibig, supra note 4, at 601.
32. West Allis Professional Policemen's Protective Ass'n, Wisc. EMP. REL.
COMM'N, Case XX, No. 17300 MP-294, Decision No. 12706, at 5.
33. While parity clauses were upheld, they were deemed to be nonmandatory
subjects of bargaining in City of Albany, 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7-3079 (1974).
See notes 61-66 infra for a discussion of this case. This remained so until in City of
New York the New York Public Employment Relations Board declared them to be
unenforceable and "a prohibited subject of negotiation." 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD.
10-3003, at 3011 (1977). See notes 67-79 infra and accompanying text.
34. This appears in five cases involving an agreement between the Policemen's
Benevolent Association (PBA) and the City of New York establishing a fixed ratio of
pay between the city's patrolmen and setgeants. Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City
of New York, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293, affd, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 (1970),
rev'd, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2634, on remand, 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3087, 78 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2747 (1971).
35. Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York, 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2293,
2297; 75 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429 (1970).
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ployer's financial ruin does not constitute sufficient hardship to justify
an employer's refusal to grant raises to the third-party union. 3 This
would be true despite the granting of increased benefits to another
union under the terms of a parity provision "which on reflection
prove[s] to be onerous, expensive, and sometimes the result of miscal-
culation." 37
Parity clauses, however, have gradually come into disfavor in other
jurisdictions due to their detrimental effect on employees' rights. 38
These cases show the willingness of the courts and public employment
commissions to uphold the employees' bargaining rights despite the
financial hardship to the employer. Factors previously recognized in
decisions enforcing parity have become determinative in invalidating
parity clauses and/or deeming them to be prohibited subjects of bar-
gaining.
One such factor is the detrimental effect of parity provisions on
harmonious labor relations. 3 As stated by the New Jersey Public
Employment Relations Commission,40 parity provisions unlawfully
infringe on the ability of the exclusive representative of the reference
union 4' to negotiate fully terms and conditions of employment on
behalf of the union. The employee organizations which had negoti-
ated the parity arrangement were found by the Commission to be "a
determinant of the scope of bargaining, the size and nature of the
economic benefit package of the employee organization which seeks to
36. id.
37. Id.
38. See Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154 (Me. 1976);
Local 1219, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations Bd., 93
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098 (1976); Medford School Comm. and Medford Teachers Ass'n,
MASS. LAB. REL. COMM'N, No. MUP-2349 (1977); City of Plainfield and Plainfield
PBA, Local 19, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4 NJPER 225 4130
(1978); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Commonwealth of Pa., Pa. Lab. Rel.
Bd., No. PERA-C-7323-C, 9 PPERB 9084 (1978).
39. The pressure created by the parity clause distorts and inhibits subsequent
negotiations and thereby interferes with the good faith negotiations between the
employer and the union which is not a party to the parity agreement. Local 1219,
Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations Bd., 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2098, 2101; City of Plainfield, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4 NJPER
225 4130, at 256; Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Commonwealth of Pa., Pa.
Lab. Rel. Bd., No. PERA-C-7323-C, 9 PPERB 9084, at 7.
40. City of Plainfield, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4 NJPER 225
4130 (1978), aff'g 4 NJPER 4114.
41. New York's provision defining the role of the exclusive representative is set
forth in N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 201(5) (McKinney 1973): "[t]he term 'employee
organization' means an organization of any kind having as its primary purpose the
improvement of terms and conditions of employment of public employees . .. ."
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negotiate independent of such a clause." 42 In addition, the mere
existence of the clause was considered sufficient to have an inevitable
chilling effect on later negotiations within the scope of the clause,
between the public employer and an employee organization not pro-
tected by a parity agreement. 43 In striking down the parity clause it
was acknowledged that these detrimental effects are difficult to prove
since "[t]he parity clause will seldom surface in later negotiations, but
it will surely be present in the minds of the negotiators and have a
restraining or coercive effect not always consciously realized."-44
III. Judicial Interpretation of New York State's "Taylor Law"
The Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 45 better known as
the "Taylor Law," governs public sector labor relations in New York
State. The intent of the Taylor Law 46 is to encourage public employ-
ees to participate fully in the process of determining all the terms and
conditions of their employment. 47 This may be accomplished by en-
couraging employees to enter into collective negotiations with their
employers through their chosen organizations and thereby reach
agreements binding upon both parties. 48 "[T]o promote harmonious
42. City of Plainfield, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4 NJPER 4114,
at 229.
43. Id; 4 NJPER 4130, at 256; see also Local 1522, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v.
Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations, 31 Conn. Supp. 15, 18, 319 A.2d 511, 513
(Conn. C.P. 1973).
44. Local 1522, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor
Relations, 31 Conn. Supp. at 19, 319 A.2d at 513.
45. N.Y. Civ. S~mv. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney 1973) [hereinafter cited as the
Taylor Law]. The Taylor Law was enacted based on the study and recommendations
of the Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, a panel manned by
Professor George W. Taylor, David L. Cole, E. Wight Bakke, John T. Dunlop and
Frederick H. Harbison, "the Nation's foremost authorities on labor relations." Gover-
nor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 392, N.Y. Laws (1967), reprinted in [1967]
N.Y. LECis. ANN. 273-74.
46. As stated in the Taylor Law, this legislation was enacted in the hope that it
would insure tranquility in the state government's labor relations: (1) by protecting
the rights of employees and the public generally, N.Y. Civ. SEnv. LAW § 200 (McKin-
ney 1973); see also Ulster County v. CSEA Unit of Ulster County Sheriff's Dep't,
Ulster County CSEA Chapter, 37 A.D.2d 437, 439, 326 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (3d Dep't
1971), and (2) by assuring at all times the orderly and uninterrupted operations and
functions of government, N.Y. Civ. SFsv. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1973). See also Civil
Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Helsby, 31 A.D.2d 325, 330, 297 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (3d
Dep't), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 993, 250 N.E.2d 230, 302 N.Y.S.2d 822 (1969).
47. N.Y. Civ. SFiv. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1973). See also Board of Educ. v.
Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 131, 282 N.E.2d 109, 114,
331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 24 (1972).
48. Sirles v. Cordary, 49 A.D.2d 330, 334, 374 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (3d Dep't 1975),
aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 950, 358 N.E.2d 1038, 390 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1976).
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and cooperative relationships between government and its employ-
ees," 49 the Taylor Law empowers a public employer to recognize
employee organizations for the purpose of collective negotiations. 50
The employer thereafter must negotiate grievances and terms and
conditions of employment. 51 Written agreements incorporating the
results of the negotiations must also be executed. 52
The scope of negotiations required by the Taylor Law has been
analyzed and defined by the New York Court of Appeals. 53 An expan-
sive view was proposed in 1972 in Board of Education v. Associated
Teachers of Huntington, Inc. 4 There, the court stated that the obliga-
tion to negotiate under the Taylor Law is broad and unqualified, to
be limited only in cases where some other express legislative provision
definitively prohibits the public employer from agreeing upon a par-
ticular term or condition of employment.55 The rule was refined in
1974 to permit negotiation of any term or condition of employment, 56
"limited [however] by plain and clear, rather than express, prohibi-
tions in the statute or decisionai law, '57 and "by public policy,
whether derived from, and whether explicit or implicit in statute or
decisional law, or in neither." 58 As a result, in evaluating the validity
49. N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1973).
50. Id. § 204(1).
51. Id. § 204(2).
52. Id.
53. New York City School Bds. Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 121,
347 N.E.2d 568, 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 214 (1976); Union Free School Dist. No. 2 v.
Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137, 143, 341 N.E.2d 532, 535, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14-15 (1975);
Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Ass'n, 37
N.Y.2d 614, 616-17, 339 N.E.2d 132, 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (1975); Syracuse
Teacher's Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 743, 744, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361
N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974); Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30
N.Y.2d 122, 127, 282 N.E.2d 109, 112, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 21 (1972); Village of
Ossining Police Ass'n v. Village of Ossining, 45 A.D.2d 867, 867, 358 N.Y.S.2d 555,
556 (2d Dep't 1974); Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist. v. Dobbs Ferry United
Teachers, 90 Misc. 2d 819, 821, 395 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1977).
54. 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972).
55. Id. at 129, 282 N.E.2d at 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
56. Syracuse Teacher's Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 743, 744, 320
N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1974).
57. Id. See also Union Free School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Cheektowaga v.
Nyquist, 38 N.Y.2d 137, 143, 341 N.E.2d 532, 535, 379 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 (1975).,
58. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers'
Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d 614, 616-17, 339 N.E.2d 132, 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (1975).
See also New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 121,
347 N.E.2d 568, 574, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208, 214 (1976); Village of Ossining Police Ass'n
v. Village of Ossining, 45 A.D.2d 867, 358 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (2d Dep't 1974); Dobbs
Ferry Union Free School Dist. v. Dobbs Ferry United Teachers, 90 Misc. 2d 819,
821, 395 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1977).
1982]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
of a wage parity clause incorporated in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the courts and state labor relations boards must determine
whether enforcement of this agreement in reference to a specific term
or condition of employment 59 is "interdicted by express statute, by
'plain and clear' statutory or decisional prohibition, or by public
policy independent of statutory or decisional law." 60
IV. The Evolving New York Approach to Parity Clauses
In 1974, the New York Public Employment Relations Board
[PERB], in City of Albany and Albany Permanent Professional Fire-
fighters Association, Local 2007,6 1 determined that a demand for
automatic parity between the salary schedule of Albany firefighters
and the yet-to-be negotiated salary schedule of Albany policemen was
not a mandatory subject of negotiation,6 2 as was argued by the fire-
fighters' union. 63 The Board recognized that the result might be differ-
ent were this not a parity clause but a demand to reopen the agree-
ment for subsequent negotiations on the wage issue due to a wage
increase given another union. 4 The firefighters' union demanded the
automatic reopening of their contract to mechanically institute the
dollar value of benefits subsequently obtained by the policemen's
union. 65 The PERB found the automatic nature of the clause's opera-
tion so objectionable that it ruled the clause non-negotiable.66
59. N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 201(4) (McKinney 1973) defines terms and conditions
of employment to include salaries, wages and hours.
60. Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 280, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (2d Dep't 1976);
see also Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122,
127, 282 N.E.2d 109, 112, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 21 (1972).
61. 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7-3079 (1974).
62. Id. at 3146. New York's Public Employment Relations Board uses the term
"nonmandatory" in the place of "permissible." Compare City of New York, 10 N.Y.
PuB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003 ("we are now asked to determine whether a demand
for 'parity' is not only a nonmandatory, but is also a prohibited, subject of negotia-
tion," id. at 3007, with Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspec-
tive, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1194 (1974) ("[t]he principal question in the private sector is
what the mandatory subjects of bargaining are . . . [t]he principal question in the
public sector is what the permissible subjects of bargaining are .... ").
63. City of Albany, 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7-3079, at 3146.
64. Were this only a demand to reopen the agreement for negotiations on the
wage issue, it would be a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id.
65. Id.
66. Lafranchise & Leibig, supra note 4, at 607. The Board acknowledged that
settlements often follow established patterns, as well as cost of living indices, and
deemed these practices "not inappropriate." City of Albany, 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL.
Bn. 7-3079, at 3146. Nonetheless, the Board was compelled to find demands for
parity nonmandatory because "the firefighters seek to be silent partners in negotia-
tions between employer and employees in another negotiating unit. Moreover, an
[Vol. XI
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New York's PERB again was faced with the issue of negotiability of
parity in 1977. In City of New York and Patrolmen's Benevolent
Association6 7 the Board considered clauses establishing parity between
the salaries of sanitationmen, firefighters, correction officers and those
of the policemen's union. The latter union was not involved in the
negotiation of the agreements entered into by the other unions. 68 The
Board declared such a provision 9 to be a prohibited subject of negoti-
ation 70 because of its inhibiting effect upon the policemen's subse-
quent collective negotiations which would become neither free nor
competitive. 7' The City of New York was prevented from evaluating
or negotiating the reference union's demands on the merits.72 Rather,
the Board acknowledged that the employer must view the demands in
the light of the parity agreement. 73
An analysis of the clause's effect led the New York PERB in City of
New York to conclude that the clause was implicitly prohibited under
the Taylor Law.74 The Taylor Law,7 5 it was held, contemplates that
an employee organization's negotiating representative should be able
agreement of this type between the City and one employee organization would
improperly inhibit negotiations between the City and another employee organization
representing employees in a different unit." Id. This opinion did not deal with other
forms of parity which do not interfere with the negotiating rights of employees in
another bargaining unit such as a demand for benefits already obtained by other
units or a demand for parity with the benefits to be paid to employees of a different
employer. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021,
at 3042 n.2 (1979).
67. 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003 (1977).
68. Id. at 3006.
69. A typical example of the clauses involved is the City-Uniformed Sanitation-
men's Association parity clause, which reads:
[i]t is expressly understood and agreed that should, at any time during the
term of the Agreement, the City of New York, or any Mayoral Agency or
instrumentality thereof, be or become, directly or indirectly, a party to
any agreement or obligation (in any way resulting from the collective
bargaining process) negotiated, consummated, executed, or awarded, in
whole or in part, with respect to comparable employees [there follows
formula language which encompasses, among others, employees in the
negotiating unit represented by the PBA] where such agreement or obliga-
tion is as to such term or condition, in any respect, on balance, more
favorable to the employees participant therein than any of the terms and
conditions hereof then such more favorable term or condition shall be
extended to the Uniformed Sanitationmen's Association at its option.
City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3006 (1977).
70. Id. at 3011.
71. Id. at 3008.
72. Id. at 3009.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3010.
75. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 202, 204(2) (McKinney 1973).
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to: (1) seek improvements in the terms and conditions of employment
that are of concern to the organization and (2) determine its negotiat-
ing priorities without the limitations of an agreement negotiated with
another employee organization. 7 The Board found that implement-
ing the clause would contravene the letter and intent of the Taylor
Law.7 7 This result is consistent with the New York Court of Appeals
decisions78 which recognize that the scope of negotiations may be
limited when the effect of an agreement would contravene the statu-
tory scheme. 79
The Board of Collective Bargaining of the New York City Office of
Collective Bargaining,8 ° in Lieutenant's Benevolent Association and
the City of New York, 81 also has found demands for parity to be
incompatible with sound bargaining principles. 82 The Board stated
that since the clause would cause the city to make unilateral, auto-
matic changes in the terms and conditions of employment, it would
result in the city's assisting the contracting union in impinging on the
bargaining of the reference organization.8 3 These decisions reflect the
increased emphasis given to the bargaining rights of the reference
union, as opposed to the contractual principles that predominated in
earlier cases. 84
Similar conclusions were reached by the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court in 1976.85 In Doyle v. City of Troy,8" the
76. City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3010.
77. Id. The Board was referring specifically to N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW §§ 202 and
204(2) (McKinney 1973).
78. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
80. The Office of Collective Bargaining is an impartial tripartite agency created
by local law as authorized by the Taylor Law § 212. It consists of two boards: the
Board of Collective Bargaining and the Board of Certification. The former helps to
bring about agreements on contracts by designating mediators and impasse panels.
The latter determines bargaining units and conducts representation elections. The
primary distinction between the Office of Collective Bargaining and the state PERB
is that the former is comprised of management (the City), labor (unions representing
city employees), and public, impartial members. PERB members are appointed
solely by the Governor. New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, "About the
OCB" 2, 4 (1982).
81. Lieutenant's Benevolent Ass'n, New York City Office of Collective Bargain-
ing, No. B-10-75 (1975).
82. Id. at 13.
83. Id. at 12 (discussing the arguments presented by the City of New York in
Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n, New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, No.
B-14-72 (1972)).
84. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
85. Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1976); Doyle v.
City of Troy, 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dep't 1976).
86. Doyle, 51 A.D.2d 845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dep't 1976).
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clause was struck down in a case involving a city charter parity
provision 87 because its operation impaired the full range of negotia-
tions to which the city was entitled under the Taylor Law.88 The court
declared the provision to be a prohibited subject of bargaining. 89 The
PERB relied on Doyle when it held that parity clauses are prohibited
subjects of negotiation.90 In City of New York,"' the Board noted that
if a parity clause in a city charter "must fall before the City's right to
negotiations under the Taylor Law, a fortiori, it must fall before such
rights of an employee organization that had no part in the establish-
ment of the clause." 92
In a subsequent decision, the appellate division expounded further
on its rationale for invalidating the parity provision. 3 In Voigt v.
Bowen, 94 the court held that parties would have had to submit salary
negotiations to an arbitration panel if they were unable to reach an
agreement concerning the effect of parity.95 This panel would be
statutorily required to consider, so far as it deems them applicable: (1)
the wages, hours and conditions of employment of public and private
employees in comparable communities,9 6 as well as, (2) "the interests
and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the public
employer to pay."'9 7 The court stated that there was no requirement
that the parties must consider these factors during collective negotia-
tions.9 8 However, in this case, the parity provision at issue entailed
dispute resolution in a manner that foreclosed the consideration of
these factors.9 The clause therefore, was "plainly, clearly and implic-
87. The city charter provision required, inter alia, "that the minimum salaries of
hosemen of the first grade in the fire department shall be equal to and at parity with
the minimum salaries of patrolmen in the first grade in the police department." Id.,
380 N.Y.S.2d at 790-91.
88. Id. at 791.
89. Id.
90. City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3008 (1977).
91. 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003 (1977).
92. Id. at 3008.
93. In Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2d Dep't 1976), the
City of Long Beach agreed with the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of
Long Beach that during the last twelve months of a forty-three month period it
would pay patrolmen at complete parity with the salary schedule of the Nassau
County Police Department, or the pre-existing salary of Long Beach patrolmen,
whichever was greater. Id. at 279, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
94. Id. at 277, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
95. Id. at 280, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
96. N.Y. Civ. Simv. LAW § 209(4)(c)(v)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
97. Id. § 209(4)(c)(v)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981). See also Caso v. Coffey, 53
A.D.2d 373, 385 N.Y.S.2d 593 (2d Dep't 1976).
98. Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d at 281, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 602-03.
99. Nassau County's financial status, not that of the City, became a determinative
factor. Instead of evaluating the wages of comparable employees "generally", the
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itly violative both of the Taylor Law and public policy." 100 The parity
clause, it was held, in effect enabled the reference union to negotiate
without any consideration of the effect of its demands on the em-
ployer. As a result, the clause had the potential to seriously undermine
harmonious relations between the employer and the original contract-
ing union. 10'
The PERB has continued to apply these principles in its recognition
of the distinction between the types of bargaining approved of in City
of Albany10 2 and the parity bargaining prohibited in City of New
York. 103 In Lynbrook Police Benevolent Association and Incorporated
Village of Lynbrook, 10 4 the Village of Lynbrook Police Benevolent
Association's (PBA) substantive demands for specific benefits, 0 5 either
derived from or identical to terms and conditions of the Nassau
County PBA, were held not to be objectionable. '0 One reason for the
Board's holding was that the Lynbrook PBA did not seek an automatic
adjustment in their contract, as was the case in City of Albany. The
demands were recognized as pattern bargaining, the validity of which
was upheld in City of Albany. 0 7 In addition, the Board held that
since the Nassau County PBA represented employees of the County
itself, the right of the Lynbrook PBA to negotiate with the Village of
Lynbrook was not impaired by the level of benefits the parties in this
case may negotiate. 08
examination was limited exclusively to the wage scale of one specific group of
employees. Those factors were unrelated to this bargaining unit and were unauthor-
ized by statute. Id. at 281-82, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
100. Id. at 281, 385 N.Y.S. at 603.
101. Id.
102. City of Albany, 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7-3079 (1974).
103. 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3011 (1977). PERB reasserted its
position when it stated:
It is one thing, as in the case of pattern bargaining, for an employer to
conclude that its resources would permit only a six percent increase to its
employees and then to have each negotiating unit negotiate which of the
terms and conditions are to be improved within that limitation. It is
another thing, as in the case of "parity" negotiations for the first employee
organization to determine its priorities and thereby foreclose such freedom
from other employee organizations or to make them beneficiaries in subse-
quent negotiations. Either effect of a "parity" clause precludes effective
and meaningful negotiations subsequently with other employee organiza-
tions.
Id. at 3010 n.l.
104. 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3067 (1977).
105. One of these demands stated "[a]ll employees shall receive an increase in
their base salaries, exclusive of longevity or other entitlements, of nine and one-half
(91/2%) percent." Id. at 3120.
106. Id. Lynbrook is a village within Nassau County.
107. 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7-3079, at 3146.
108. 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3067, at 3120.
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In Mutual Aid Association of the Paid Fire Department of the City
of Yonkers, Local 628, International Association of Fire Fighters and
City of Yonkers'09 a similar decision was rendered. In that case, the
PERB held that a contract provision providing for the reopening of
negotiations in the event of the granting of additional benefits to
another bargaining unit was not a prohibited subject of negotiation. 110
The language of the clause was acceptable since the event of reopen-
ing the contract for adjustment would not occur automatically, but
rather only at the option of the firefighters' union."' The result of
such renewed negotiations would not be predetermined, but rather
would be agreed to by the parties.
The PERB continued to invalidate parity agreements which inter-
fered with the statutory negotiation rights of employees under the
Taylor Law."l2 In Rockville Centre Principals Association and Rock-
ville Centre Union Free School District"l3 the Board struck down a
wage parity proposal "tie-in" provision which based school principals'
salaries on those yet-to-be negotiated by the school district and the
teachers' union." 4 In doing so, the Board deemed the case of Niagara
Wheatfield Administrators Association and Niagara Wheatfield Cen-
tral School District15 not to be dispositive." 6
In Niagara Wheatfield, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a
contract clause providing for the continuation of contractual benefits
after the expiration of the contract was valid and reinstated an arbi-
trator's award enforcing a parity clause." 7 The Board found that the
Niagara Wheatfield opinion did not reflect any City of New York
considerations since the validity of the parity clause was not at issue
and was therefore assumed." 8 In Niagara Wheatfield the court had
ruled that the tie-in provision alone was not offensive to public pol-
109. 10 N.Y. PuB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-4530 (1977).
110. Id. at 4563. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
111. 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-4530, at 4563.
112. See notes 50-63 supra and accompanying text.
113. 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021 (1979).
114. The Board considered City of New York to be a clear precedent. In that case
the city agreed to extend to firefighters any wage increases that might thereafter be
obtained by the policemen in negotiations. 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021, at
3042-43.
115. 44 N.Y.2d 68, 375 N.E.2d 37, 404 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1978).
116. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021, at
3043.
117. The arbitrator issued an award ordering the school board to reimburse each
administrator according to terms of the parity provision requiring the school board to
adjust the administrators' salaries to reflect the increases granted to the teachers. 44
N.Y.2d at 71-72, 375 N.E.2d at 39, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
118. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021, at
3043.
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icy.19 In fact, such a parity clause was statutorily required by the
New York State Education Law until 1971.120 The Niagara Wheat-
field court, however, did not consider the rationale for the statute's
repeal specifically, that it was inconsistent with the Taylor Law.' 2'
This rationale represented a new public policy in this area and was
deemed by the PERB in Rockville Centre to support its understanding
of the shift in the scope of proper negotiation now contemplated by
the Taylor Law: 122 that in the future, public employees would "re-
ceive that compensation obtained through the collective bargaining
process" 23 in order to foster harmonious employer-employee negotia-
tions.
An alternative to the City of New York 2 4 ruling is presented by the
dissenting opinions filed in that case and another subsequent case. 125
Recognizing the guiding principles regarding the scope of collective
negotiations which emphasize an expansive policy and narrow excep-
tion, 26 dissenting Member Klaus, in City of New York, construed
parity clauses as not prohibited by any plain and clear provision of the
Taylor Law or state public policy as exemplified by state statutes or
common law. 127 Moreover, Niagara Wheatfield128 seems to establish
implicitly that in the context of public employment relations, parity
clauses do not contravene public policy. 2 9 Member Klaus questioned
119. 44 N.Y.2d at 73, 375 N.E.2d at 40, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
120. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3103 (McKinney 1981) (repealed 1971). This section: (1)
provided the minimum salary schedules for teachers, (2) mandated specific salary
increases, and (3) specified that principals and other supervisory personnel receive a
salary at least 30% higher than those received by teachers. Memorandum of State
Senate Committee on Rules, reprinted in [1971] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 51-52.
121. Memorandum of State Senate Committee on Rules, reprinted in [1971] N.Y.
LEGIS. ANN. 51-52.
122. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMp. REL. BD. 12-3021, at
3043.
123. Memorandum of State Senate Committee on Rules, reprinted in [1971] N.Y.
LEGIS. ANN. 52. The PERB thus found parity clauses of the Niagara Wheatfield
category offensive to the Taylor Law as presently construed and a prohibited subject
of bargaining. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-
3021, at 3043.
124. See notes 67-79 supra and accompanying text.
125. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMp. REL. BD. 12-3021, at
30.44 (Klaus, dissenting); City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003,
at 3011 (Klaus, dissenting).
126. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
127. City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMp. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3012 (Klaus,
dissenting).
128. 44 N.Y.2d 68, 375 N.E.2d 37, 404 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1978).
129. This understanding stems from the recognition that the court must have
noted and disposed of this issue before addressing the broader question in that case.
Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021, at 3044
(Klaus, dissenting).
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how a demand dealing with salaries, a term defined as within the
scope of terms and conditions of employment that are negotiable
under the Taylor Law,1 30 could be found unlawful.13'
Member Klaus suggested that through its processes the PERB, in
City of New York, was defining a public policy and imposing it on the
parties 132 by condemning the clause because it believed its presence
"to be so pernicious as to deprive employees of their basic rights under
the Act."' 33 She stated that the Board was thereby regulating terms
and conditions of employment that the Taylor Law has left to the
negotiating parties to determine for themselves. 34 She indicated that
it is beyond the Board's legislative grant of authority to declare such a
policy and then find the clauses illegal per se as a subject of negotia-
tion. 35 Moreover, Member Klaus recognized that the inclusion of the
clause may in fact have a beneficial effect in the negotiating process.
The clause may promote the early resolution of bargaining disputes
and the timely conclusion of an agreement by providing the contract-
ing union with assurance that it.will not risk less favorable treatment
by an early settlement as compared with playing for "the competitive
advantage of a long wait-and-see policy." 36
In addition to these dissents there have been recent PERB opinions
which recognize the City of New York rule, yet hold that a union's
demand to establish automatic parity is merely a nonmandatory sub-
ject of negotiation. 37
The most recent case decided on this issue in New York manifests
another shift in the law on enforceability of parity agreements. In
City of Schenectady and City Fire Fighters Union, Local 28, Interna-
130. N.Y. Civ. SEv. LAW §§ 201(4), 204(3) (McKinney Supp. 1981).
131. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021, at
3044 (Klaus, dissenting).
132. City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3011-12 (Klaus,
dissenting).
133. Id. at 3012 (Klaus, dissenting).
134. Id. at 3011 (Klaus, dissenting).
135. Id. (Klaus, dissenting).
136. Id. at 3012 (Klaus, dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Greenville Uniformed Firemen's Ass'n, Local 2093, Int'l Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, 15 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 15-4501, at 4509 (1981) (firefighters'
union's proposal, providing for extension to rank-and-file firefighters of all benefits
already granted to superior officers, was not mandatorily negotiable because it was
not limited to terms and conditions of employment); Onondaga Community College,
11 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 11-3045, at 3069 (1978) (teachers' union's demand to
establish automatic parity between benefits of unit employees and those granted to
other county employees is not mandatorily negotiable since there is no duty to
negotiate over a demand which may be changed automatically based on the outcome
of a different negotiating unit's bargaining).
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tional Association of Fire Fighters,138 the Appellate Division of the
New York State Supreme Court ruled that such clauses are not per se
invalid, and thus not automatically prohibited subjects of bargain-
ing.139 The court held that a case-by-case examination of the factual
circumstances surrounding each agreement is required. 140 The facts
presented to the court in City of Schenectady differed from those of all
prior parity cases in a very significant aspect-both bargaining unions
involved had jointly agreed to the incorporation of the parity clauses
in their respective contracts. 141
The court addressed two public policy objections regarding the
incorporation of parity provisions in public employee collective bar-
gaining agreements: parity clauses (1) limit the full range of negotiat-
ing rights granted to thecity under the Taylor Law by inhibiting
subsequent negotiations with one group on the merits of its de-
mands 142 and (2) effectively entail dispute resolution without the con-
sideration of the "interests and welfare of the public and the financial
ability of the public employer to pay." 143
The court relied on its restricted authority to strike down provisions
in bargained-for agreements or to overturn arbitration awards enforc-
ing these agreements, on the ground that they offend public policy.
The court stated that this limited judicial power exists "[o]nly when
the award contravenes a strong public policy, almost invariably in-
volving an important constitutional or statutory duty or responsibil-
ity . . . . " 144 The courts are encouraged to exercise restraint so as not
to disturb the bargained-for and agreed upon process for dispute
138. 85 A.D.2d 116, 448 N.Y.S.2d 806 (3d Dep't 1982).
139. Id. at 118-19, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
140. Id. at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
141. The relevant history indicates that the City of Schenectady negotiated sepa-
rate agreements effective January 1, 1980, with the police and firefighters' unions
jointly with each agreement containing a parity clause. In September, 1980, the
Police Benevolent Association and the city entered into a supplementary agreement
which increased the policemen's overtime compensation from straight time to time
and a half. The city refused to afford the same additional remuneration to the
firefighters. The arbitrator directed enforcement of the parity provision. The Su-
preme Court of Schenectady County refused to grant the city's motion to set aside the
arbitrator's award on the grounds that enforcement of the parity provision was
against public policy. Id. at 116-17, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
142. Id. at 118, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (quoting Doyle v. City of Troy, 51 A.D.2d
845, 380 N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dep't 1976), citing City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP.
REL. BD. 10-3003 (1977)).
143. 85 A.D.2d at 118, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (quoting N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW
§ 209(4)(c)(v)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981)).
.144. 85 A.D.2d at 117-18, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (quoting Port Jefferson Station
Teachers Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 898, 899, 383 N.E.2d 553, 554, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1978)).
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resolution. 145 Although it may be argued that every controversy in-
volves some issue that requires weighing public policy considerations,
the court held there are but a small number of matters "recognized as
so intertwined with overriding public policy considerations as to ei-
ther place them beyond the bounds of the arbitration process itself or
mandate the vacatur of awards which do violence to the principles
upon which such matters rest." 146 The circumstances and issues of this
case were deemed not to fall into that situation. 147
The appellate division analogized 148 to the facts of Niagara Wheat-
field 149 and recognized that while in both cases the two aforemen-
tioned potential vices did exist, the Niagara Wheatfield court re-
frained from invalidating the tie-in provision when it determined that
the following factors were satisfied: (1) the application of the provi-
sion must be reasonably limited in time, (2) the enforcement of the
provision must not impair the city's ability to negotiate and (3) the
provision must not imperil the employer financially. 150 Similarly, the
appellate division determined that the arbitrator's award enforcing
parity in City of Schenectady was not violative of public policy after
it, too, found these factors were met. 5'
V. Conclusion
The holding in City of Schenectady conforms with prior decisions
striking down parity clauses negotiated without the input or approval
of the third-party union. 152 The reasons cited by the courts included:
these agreements (1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce the third-party
union in the exercise of its negotiating rights, 15 3 (2) may entail bad
145. 85 A.D.2d at 118, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
146. Id. (quoting Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 630, 389 N.E.2d 456,
459, 415 N.Y.S.2d 974, 977 (1979)).
147. 85 A.D.2d at 119-20, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
148. Id. at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
149. See notes 115-21 supra and accompanying text.
150. City of Schenectady, 85 A.D.2d at 119, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
151. The duration of the three year contract was deemed reasonably limited in
time; the possibility that the city's ability to negotiate was impaired was rebutted by
evidence of the city's actual resolution of the dispute regarding overtime with the
PBA and there was a lack of evidence that granting the additional compensation to
the firemen would have an effect on the public purse. Id. at 119-20, 448 N.Y.S.2d at
809.
152. Rockville Centre Principals Ass'n, 12 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 12-3021, at
3044 (Klaus, dissenting); City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003,
at 3011 (Klaus, dissenting); City of Albany, 7 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 7-3079, at
3146.
153. Local 1219, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations Bd.,
93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098, 2101 (1976); Medford School Comm., MAss. LAB. REL.
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faith bargaining154 and (3) violate the principle of exclusivity of bar-
gaining units by expanding and diluting them. 155 These grounds are
premised on the fact that the clause imposes future wage equality on
the reference union which had not participated in the creation of the
parity agreement. As a result, the parity clause causes the reference
union to bargain on behalf of persons other than those whom it
represents. 156
This unfair burden is not thrust upon a reference union which, like
the firefighters in City of Schenectady, participated in the negotia-
tions and with full knowledge and awareness of the clause's effect,
voluntarily agreed to the incorporation of the clause in their collective
bargaining agreement. The court's determination on the facts before
it is in accord with the Taylor Law, which allows negotiation of
nonmandatory subjects of bargaining as long as those subjects are not
violative of public policy. The earlier wholesale invalidation of parity
clauses on public policy grounds in City of New York did not antici-
pate the development of parity clause arrangements which tend to
COMM'N, No. MUP-2349, at 4 (1977); City of Plainfield, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel.
Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4 NJPER 4130, at 256 (1978); City of New York, 10 N.Y. PuB.
EMp. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3010 (1977); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v.
Commonwealth of Pa., Pa. Lab. Rel. Bd., No. PERA-C-7323-C, at 9, 9 PPERB 9-
9084 (1978).
154. The bad faith bargaining manifests itself in the negotiation of the clause and/
or in the employer's resistance to the third-party union's demands on the basis of a
parity clause. Medford School Comm., MAss. LAB. REL. COMM'N, No. MUP-2349, at
3 (1977); City of New York, 10 N.Y. PUB. EMP. REL. BD. 10-3003, at 3006 (1977);
Wheeler, Berger & McGarry, supra note 9, at 179-80.
155. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Lewiston, 354 A.2d 154, 161 (Me.
1976); Voigt v. Bowen, 53 A.D.2d 277, 282, 385 N.Y.S.2d 600, 603 (2d Dep't 1976);
Local 1219, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. Connecticut Labor Relations Bd., 93
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2098, 2101 (1976); Local 1522, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v.
Connecticut Labor Relations Bd., 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2307, 2309 (Conn. C.P.
1973); Medford School Comm., MAss. LAB. REL. COMM'N, No. MUP-2349, at 4
(1977).
156. None of the aforementioned cases should be construed as requiring an em-
ployer "to bargain with blinders on, oblivious to the impact that one wage settlement
may have on other negotiations." Medford School Comm., MASS. LAB. REL.
COMM'N, No. MUP-2349, at 4-5 (1977). By the very nature of a parity provision, the
public employer who, during the course of negotiations agrees to grant any addi-
tional compensation or fringe benefit, must weigh the immediate economic conse-
quences of such a proposal with the ultimate result of providing similar increases to
those other employee organizations who are the beneficiaries of a parity clause in
their agreement. City of Plainfield, N.J. Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm'n, No. 78-87, 4
NJPER 4114, at 229 (1978). Rather, these cases, including City of Schenectady,
define the rule for the future to be that an employer may not impose such a result on
one employee organization through bargaining with another when the result would
entail these detrimental, impermissible effects on collective bargaining.
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stabilize employer-employee relationships. The City of Schenectady
decision shows sensitivity to parity clauses which in certain circum-
stances not only are not violative of Taylor Law imperatives, but
rather actively support its stated goal of fostering harmonious labor
relations.
City of Schenectady recognized that some parity clause arrange-
ments can allow the employer and one or more unions to plan and
execute long-range agreements. Two or more unions can agree among
themselves that one union can implicate the others in a parity ar-
rangement. Thus, the courts should follow City of Schenectady and
uphold the validity of parity clauses where no union's right to freedom
of bargaining is impinged.
Susan P. Kass

